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Abstract 
 
The idea of democratic rule requires that democratically elected civilian government should have 
effective authority over the army. The role of national army is purely for defence. Army’s direct 
involvement in politics will undermine its capability to cope with external threats. Indonesia is an 
example where the army was deeply involved in the country’s political affairs. This article shows that 
Indonesian national army has already possessed political orientation since the beginning of 
Indonesia’s independence. Military and political functions performed by the Indonesian army during 
revolutionary war has been influential factor in shaping army’s doctrine and self-perception of his role 
as not only the guardian of the state but also political force of the country. The weakness of civilian 
institutions, elite conflicts and national culture especially Javanese tradition has contributted as well to 
this situation. The role of Indonesian army in politics has gradually decreased since the reform of 
Indonesia’s political system initiated in 1998.    
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Introduction 
The issue of civil-military relations has been extensively discussed by scholars 
focusing on their academic research to find an ideal model in managing the two 
entities – the military and elected civilian government. Generally, an attempt to 
create military professionalism is by putting it under the control of civilian 
government. In democratic political climate, the main task of military is defending 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity from external threats, while government 
has respobilities to formulate and decide the whole policies including national 
defence. On the other words, the government deals with strategy, and the military 
engages in tactics. Civilian government is a client of the military, and the military is a 
subordinate of the government. It will create ineffective government if the military 
intrudes on the political realm and takes over the government from civilian control. 
But sometimes the military also intervenes in civilian led government in the name 
political stability. 
The problem of military involvement in politics generally happens to 
developing countries. The military intrudes on political affairs usually due to the fact 
that the weakness of civilian government. It is common issue for developing 
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countries when they come to existence without strong political institutions and, to 
some extent, social bases at grassroot level. The absence of political institutions and 
social bases is able to effect the running of government whereas civilian elites lack 
capability to mobilize their supporters in balancing military power. As consequence, 
the military is able to easily intervene and take over civilian led government.  
Indonesia is one of countries whereas the military has had a great amount of 
influence in political life. The military has crucial roles in the war for independence. 
Even in the following years after independence, it has become one of important 
actors in determing country’s political trajectories. And it got momentum to involve in 
politics after failed blooshed rebellion of PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) or 
Communist Party of Indonesia in 1965. Afterward, the military along with Golkar as 
government party became the main supporters of Suharto’s New Order for more 
than three decades. Even in its development, Indonesian army has introduced the 
concept of dwifungsi. It simply means that Indonesian army has functioned as not 
only main defender of the nation but social and political roles in creating and 
maintaining national stability. 
The fall of Suharto’s New Order in 1998 has triggered reformation of 
Indonesian political system. The role of civilian government has been strengthened. 
Political parties are of crucial roles in influencing and determining the outcomes of 
political processes or events. Civil society is more enthusiastic to pay attentions in 
social and political matters. Attempts to create military professionalism is increased. 
And military dualism manifested in the concept of dwifungsi has been diminished. It 
does not have its representatives anymore in the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR). Military officials who are interested in competing political 
positions are required to retire from their military careers. In short, Indonesia’s 
politics has become more democratic now. And here placing the military under 
civilian control is an important requirement, as many observers believe, to achieve 
democratic consolidation. 
This article attempts to explore several important factors effecting civil-military 
relations in Indonesia. It also explains reforms of Indonesian army after the fall of 
Suharto’s New Order, and describes new pattern of civil-military relations in 
Indonesia after democratic transition. This article is divided into four main parts. First, 
it deals with literature discussing an ideal pattern of civil-military relations and the 
reasons why the army intervenes in political life of the country. Second, it examines 
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factors causing Indonesian army involvement in politics by tracing the roles it has 
played during revolutionary war. Third, it describes reforms of the army as a 
consequence of the changing of Indonesian political system. The last is concluding 
remarks from previous discussion. 
 
Literature Review 
There are many existing theories which explain patterns of civil-military relations. 
Political scientists stress on different factors to analyze why the military seizes power 
from civilian government and the latter, to some extents, seems so weak vis-a-vis 
the former. For example, Michael C. Desch (1999) emphasizes on strategic 
environments of a country – internal and external threats – as the main cause 
influencing civil dominance over the army and vice versa. When domestic threats are 
high, the control of civilian government is weak. But when external threats are high, 
the potentiality for army involvement in politics is weak. Here, the second conditions 
show an ideal model of civil-military relations. Civilian elites has bigger control over 
the army. They are aware of national security. There will be a cohesiveness in the 
army as an institution because its orientation is outward looking to face external 
threats. And army adventurism into politics can be diminished. 
David Kuehn and Philip Lorenz (2011) argue that ‘‘explaination of civil-military 
relations has to cover three crucial issues including agential entities, environmental 
variables and the relationship between agent and environment’’. Furthermore, they 
elaborate relevant actors along with their interests, environemntal factors influencing 
power relations between civilian leaders and the army, and possible actions as the 
result of the relationship batween environment and agency. Both authors not only 
define and specify these three issues but try to systematically analyze agency and 
structure in explaining patterns of civil-military relations called as ‘integrative’ 
approaches by examining theories developed by some prominent scholars like 
Muhtiah  Alagappa, Aguero, Trinkunas, and Croissant et al as well. Even though 
these four experts have different analytical focus, they agree “that civil-military 
relations are determined by the interplay of civilians and military actors’’. 
Political institutionalization places an important position in new democratic 
countries where it functions as balancing power of the army. ‘The configuration of 
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threats perceived by the army interacts with a society’s political institutionalization 
and the popular legitimacy of the civilian government to determine a military 
obedience to civilian control’ (Staniland, 2008, 332). By combining environmental 
threats, he also pays attention to civilian legitimacy because ‘different threat levels 
demand different levels of political legitimacy and institutionalization’ to marginalize 
the military from political matters. 
Civilian control of the army is a primary condition for democratic consolidation. 
The basic idea of democracy suggests that the government has the authority to take 
policies without intervention from non-democratic institution like the army. The 
government holds legitimate power to decide national policies because it is 
democratically elected by the people while the army is not. In order to be able to 
differentiate degree of civilian control, Croissant and Kuehn (2009) identifies three 
decision-making areas including “elite recruitment and overall public policy, national 
defence and internal security” (page. 190). The first area is an absolute requirement 
to democratic consolidation. The existence of free and fair general elections is able 
to give political elites an effective power to make and implement political decisions in 
all political affairs. Even though the army is involved in policy formulation on national 
defence and dealing with internal security in the matters of insurgencies and 
terrorism, civilian government is the supreme actor who legally holds final decisions. 
The conception of civil-military relations simply puts ‘civil’ and ‘military’ into 
two different spheres. Professionalism of the army officers will be achieved if military 
is strictly separated from civilian institutions. Hutington (1957), a proponent of military 
professionalism, points out that “politics is beyond the scope of military competence 
and participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism’’. The 
degree of civilian control over the army can be assessed by using two indicators 
namely subjective and objective. Under subjective control, civilian administration 
tries to completely control the army and makes it as an integral part of the 
government. On the contrary, objective control endeavors to enhance military 
professionalism whereas this condition will marginalize the military from politics and 
provide its neutrality. But the pattern of civil-military relations in Indonesia is totally 
differed from the Western countries. The strict separation of civil and military spheres 
was hardly knwon in Indonesia and other Southeast Asia countries such as Thailand 
and Philiphines. In this sense, Heiduk (2011) suggests that “it is necessary to 
dissolve the dichotomy of ‘military’ vs. ‘civilian’ institutions and take a deeper look at 
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the underlying power structures of the transition processes” (page. 255-256). This is 
because struggle between contesting social force will determine trajectory, scope 
and sustainability of a country’s democratization (Bellin, 2000; Heiduk, 2011). This 
means that we have to observe “socio-economic configuration of society vis-a-vis 
political institutions” in order to get the whole view on army involvement in political 
affairs. 
 Rebecca L. Schiff (1997) proposes “concordance theory” as an alternative in 
understanding civil-military relations by viewing “the military, political elites, and 
citenzenry as three partners that should aim for cooperative relationship. 
Concordance theory explains the specific conditions determining military’s role in the 
domestic sphere including the government and society”. There are four indicators to 
be examined – “social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making 
process, recruitment method and military style. Concordance theory considers the 
unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other 
possibilities for civil-military relations”. Furthermore, “it accomplishes two goals. First, 
it explains the institutional and cultural conditions affecting relations among the three 
partners. Second, it predicts that if three partners agree on four indicators, domestic 
military intervention is less likely to occur” (page. 8-12). 
 
The Nature of Indonesian Army  
Indonesia’s army is one of important actors during the war for independence. The 
establishment of Indonesia’s armed forces is unique. It was not founded by the 
government. It was Indonesia’s people especially the youth who had important roles 
in establishing the army. And it can be traced back to Japanese policy during 
occupational periods in Indonesia. Japan mobilized Indonesian youth (pemuda) in 
military training known as Pembela Tanah Air/PETA (Defender of the Motherland) 
and other armed organizations where as they could be used as volunteers or troop 
substitutions for supporting Japanese wars. This policy of mobilization gave the 
youth martial skills, and it also triggered ‘‘an awareness among the youth on the 
need to fight colonial powers for country independence’’ (Said, 1992, 5).  
Initially there was reluctance from the new government to establish an army. 
This was because civilian elites worried the possisbility of invasion from the Allies 
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after Japanese surrender. The first agency for Indonesia’s military was BKR (Badan 
Keamanan Rakyat/People’s Security Organization). But it was not an army because 
“it was not centrally organized, had no headquarters, and its formation was 
dependent on the initiative of National Committe or Komite Nasional Indonesia/KNI” 
(Said, 1992, 22). Then it was renamed as TKR1 (Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat/the 
Army of People’s Security) on 5 November 1945. The components of Indonesia’s 
armed forces were made of KNIL (Koninklijke Nederrlands-Indische Leger/the Royal 
Netherland East Indies Army), PETA, and laskar or partisans (Sundhaussen, 1986, 
21-22).  
Actually the government appointed a former KNIL officer, Urip Sumoharjo, as 
the chief-of-staff of the army assisted by Didi Kartasasmita, Nasution, Simatupang, 
Alex Kawilarang for the task of organizing the army. But, in every attempt of 
organizing the army, they faced realities that, whenever they tried to select 
commanders at local units, the commanders had been elected by troops. PETA’s 
suspicion to KNIL officers made it more difficult to organize the army. PETA officers 
getting Japanese indoctrination to believe in spirit (semangat) and hate the white 
man. As consequences, they saw the former KNIL officers as Dutch’s collaborators. 
And the problems became more serious on account the fact that the central 
government did not give clear directions. “There were no policy guidelines and no 
attempt was made to control the recruitment and promotion of officers or to bring the 
military structure under government control” (Jenkins, 1983, 16). And it had its own 
policy in dealing with the enemy – the Allies and Dutch. Finally, Urip held a military 
conference for discussing common solutions and finding proper way to face the 
enemy in Yogyakarta on 11 November 1945. But participants of the conference 
pointed out that what the military need in the beginning was a commander-in-chief or 
panglima besar. The conference that was dominated by PETA officers, of course, did 
not favour Urip for the supreme position of the military. So most of participants 
selected Sudirman having background from PETA to be the first of commander-in-
chief of Indonesia’s armed forces. Moreover, they also elected Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono IX as the minister of defence (see Said, 1992; Sundhaussen, 
                                                             
1 On 23 February 1946, it was renamed as TRI (Tentara Reublik Indonesia) or Army of the Republic of 
Indonesia. TRI was changed to TNI (Tentara National Indonesia) or Indonesian National Army on 3 June 1946. 
Under the New Order, it was replaced with ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) or Armed Forces 
of the Republic of Indonesia. Finally, TNI is formally used once again as the name of Indonesian Millitary since 
political reform in 1999. 
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1986). What we can be inferred here is that it was the army itself creating its own 
organization as a tool of defense for the new state.  
Indonesian army has already possessed political orientation since begining of 
its existence. During revolutionary period from 1945 to 1949, it played roles in the 
matters of not only defense but also political realm. Army involvement in Indonesia’s 
politics for the next decades is due to ‘‘this blurred distinction between its military and 
political functions during revolutionary war against the Dutch’’ (Crouch, 1978, 25) 
where the army see themselves as one of political forces in the country. As its 
consequence, the army had different views with government policies. For example, 
during the war for independence, the government favoured diplomacy as a way of 
facing enemy while the military preferred armed struggle.  Ambiguous attitudes of the 
central government in establishing an army was another cause. In this case, ‘the 
reluctance of the government to deal with the military in the early days of 
independence had already created a particular pattern of civil-military relations, and 
all subsequent efforts to bring the army under civilian control failed’ (Said, 1992, 33).  
There was an attempt to put Indonesian army under civilian control. For 
instance, under the Constitution of 1950, the army accepted the supremacy of 
civilian government. But this condition just was temporary. Gradually, the army 
expanded its political role. This was because ‘the weakness of succesive political 
system provided opportunities that military leaders exploited’ (Crouch, 1978, 27). 
The government was only able to last for a short period of time. There was 
polarization among civilian politicians where they were splitted into ideological 
preference of their political parties. The army itself actually was not a cohesive 
institution. It was divided into several factions of army elites. There were conflicting 
views and interests between them. On the one hand, the army distrusted politicians. 
But elites of the army sometimes were fell into struggle between the government and 
opposition parties in order to achieve their short-sighted objectives.  
Implementation of martial law in 1957 was an entry point for the army to return 
to political realm. Martial law proved the failure of civilian politician to run government 
effectively and gave the army legitimacy to involve in political life of the country. The 
army enhanced its power and authority in response to domestic disorders caused by 
regional rebellions. The success of the army in dealing with rebellions absolutely 
emphasized its role as the protector of the nation (Jenkins, 1983, 19). Furthermore, 
The army played roles in not only military and political functions but also economy. In 
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the name of martial law, the army had also controlled Dutch’s companies that were 
nationalized by Indonesian government. 
Army’s direct involvement in national politics would come to an end when the 
martial law dismissed. It could not last forever. It was just temporary situation as a 
response to the outbreak of regional rebellions. The emergence of Guided 
Democracy by restoring 1945 Constitution gave the army opportunity to deeply 
involve in national politics. The concession of functional group to the army “has given 
it rudimentary form as political organization guaranteeing it a basis for political 
participation”. Accordingly, “the army’s elite was integrated into the political structure 
of the nation and was satisfied” (Lev, 1963, 360). Officers of the army have taken 
their places in most of public institutions such as parliament, advisory council, and 
even chiefs of local government.  
Under Guided Democracy, the army was one of pillars of the system along 
with President Sukarno and Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The rivalry 
between the army and PKI coloured Indonesia’s political configuration since 1959. 
Sukarno played balancing role in the middle of two conflicting institutions – the army 
and PKI. Compared to other national parties, PKI was more disciplined organization 
and had strong bases in the grassroot of Indonesian society. PKI was the main 
political rival of the army at that time. The army viewed  PKI as “one remaining 
powerful political party whose threat to Indonesia’s future was made serious by its 
foregn ties; and as a threat to the army position” (Lev, 1963, 357) especially its 
social, economic and political interests. But the army got much bigger roles after it 
successfully eliminated Communist Party and marginalized Sukarno from political 
stage because of failed rebellion by PKI on 30 September 1965. In this case, 
Indonesian army’s involvement in politics differs from countries where army officers 
has seized power from civilian administration by coup d’etat. It is important to take 
into serious consideration Harold Crouch’s argument that Indonesian army came to 
power by undergoing ‘a lengthy period of preparation, during which they learned 
skills of negotiating, bargaining and compromising’ (Crouch, 1978, 35).  
Army intervention in Indonesian politics was then legitimized by the concept of 
dual function (dwifungsi). It is “an assertion that it is legitimate and necessary for 
Indonesian army to take on both military and non-military roles” (Lee, 2000, 693). In 
short, it justified that the army not only served as the guardian of the state but was 
social and political force of the country as well. By referring to dwifungsi, “the 
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Indonesian army believed that it was righfully first a political and only second a 
military institution. This led to the development of an interventionist political culture in 
which the army saw itself as having right to involve in politics. This was also 
particularly true with regard to the safeguarding of Pancasila as national ideology, 
the 1945 Constitution and the unity and unitary nature of the state” (Singh, 2000, 
616). 
Even though this concept was formally introduced in the New Order, 
conceptual development of dwifungsi can be traced back to the previous 
government. Explaination of historical narrative of the army above has clearly 
described dual function of the army. It is Nasution who first proposed publicly the 
concept of dwifungsi known as Jalan Tengah (Middle Way) at that time. He stated  
that “the position of the army was not solely an instrument of the government. 
Rather, it was one of the forces of the people’s struggle together with other forces 
such as parties” (Jenkins, 1983, 20). Luckily, this idea came into existence at 
favorable time when “Soekarno needed an ally to oppose the various parties that 
under Parliamentary democracy failed to create stable governments” (Said, 2006, 
121).  
The experience during revolutionary war against the Ducth have gradually 
developed “a participatory political culture that included army’s involvement in politics 
which was later codified in the concept of dwifungsi” (Singh, 2000, 616). The root of 
dwifungsi actually has its origin in Javanese tradition as well whereas soldiers are 
considered as kesatria or knight (Britton, 1996). A king according to Javanese 
tradition acts as not only the leader of government but also the commander of the 
army. Here, there is no clear distinction between civilian and military life. This 
Javanese value was actualized by army officers during revolutionary war whereas 
military leaders performed political function as well. Javanese officers who 
dominated membership of the Indonesian army since independence have espoused 
this proposition. This also explains why there was no military coup during Sukarno’s 
administration although the army emerged as the only cohesive political force of the 
country at that time. “The officer corps was divided in its attituted towards Sukarno 
whereas many Javanese officers were personally quite loyal to him” (Lev, 1963, 
359). In the end, dwifungsi have played critical role in shaping a pattern of civil-
military relations in Indonesia since the country came into existence. Consequently, 
most of army officers has dedicated to not only service the country but also control 
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power in politics and economy. So it is not surprisingly to say that the army and 
politics in Indonesian context has been inseparable. 
 
The Reforms of Indonesian Army 
Civil-military relations in Indonesia have showed that civilian elites seemed weak vis-
a-vis the army. The central government indecisiveness in the early days of 
independence to create an army and roles played by the army in both politics and 
defence during revolutionary war has contributed to the rise of the army as one of 
political forces in the country. As a result, the government faced difficulties to put the 
army under its control. The failure of civilian politicians to create stable governments 
has also given the army opportunities to exploit the situation for its corporate 
interests. As Sundhaussen points out, the Indonesian army’s active and direct 
involvement in politics since independence is due to the military defending its 
corporate interests against civilian infringement and the failure of civilian government 
to run the country (Sundhaussen, 1983). And for more than four decades, the army 
has taken roles in not merely military functions but also almost every aspect of public 
life in the country. 
It was true that Indonesia adopted constitutional democracy in the begining of 
independence. But it must be also acknowledged that the foundation of democracy 
was weak. Political parties were important forces to support continuity of democratic 
system at that time. But they also undermined it because of polarization among 
political elites causing the rise and fall of central government in short period of time. 
Consequently, civilian administration failed to run government effectively. Finally, 
“the failure of constitutional democracy and threats of national disintegration had 
provided the army to present itself as a defense force and social-political force 
whose direct involvement in politics was politically acceptable and constitutionally 
legitimate” (Anwar, 2001, 11). 
The situation above had proved that the army was the only institution 
possesing capabilities to overcome the problem of national disorders. There was 
popular opinion in Indonesian society viewing the army as an alternative to create 
national stability. National culture in this sense has critical role in forming “familial 
system” considering the army as “an integral member of country’s political family, 
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and any attempt to exclude the army from national politics would be able to 
undermine the political system that was conceived in the struggle for independence” 
(Singh, 2000, 629).  
Under Suharto’s New Order, the army then appeared as the main supporter of 
authoritarian rule. Developmentalist ideology that believed that authoritarian regime 
was necessary to ensure political stability and finally support economic development 
of the country made condition easier for the army to consolidate its power and 
penetrate all aspect of public institution and social organization. It was a fact that the 
New Order still mantained democratic insttitutions such as political parties, general 
elections, and legislative councils. But the substance of democracy was cheated by 
the ruling elites dominated by Suharto and the army. People were not really free to 
elect their leaders and express their aspirations. In this case, democracy was just 
symbolic. Another example was the existence of Golkar or functional group as 
political machine of the government. Its members were mainly made of government 
employees and state-related organizations. It was also a participant in general 
election. The ability of Golkar to win every general election from 1971 to 1997 had 
provided the government political and constitutional legitimacy to rule the country. By 
combining ‘’political penetration, manipulation and co-optation with exclusion and 
repression’’ the ruling elites were able to prolong their domination in political stage 
(Anwar, 2001, 13-15).  
The context of Indonesia’s social structure also presented a favorable 
condition for the army to ensure its dominance in country’s politics. “The Indonesian 
class structure lacked two important classes namely strong indigenous bourgeoisie 
and big-landlord class which in other countries have provided social bases for 
political movements which have to some extent been able to balance and limit the 
power of central bureaucracy” (Crouch, 1988, 355). As a developing country like 
Indonesia, India is a good example for this case. One of important factors of Indian 
civilian politicians succesfully controlling its army and marginalizing it from politics is 
due to “a subtantial mass presence of Indian National Congress (INC) supported by 
broad social coalition  that included members of all India’s main religious groups” 
(Wilkinson, 2015, 13) finally creating party institutionalization and the ability of INC to 
form an Indian-wide network of alliance with India’s capitalists and landed peasantry 
or local elites in the country (Pardesi & Ganguly, 2010, 58). 
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The Fall of Suharto’s New Order on May 1998 has paved the way for reforms 
of Indonesian armed forces. Army’s direct involvement in politics and its track 
records in human right abuses in the past has been widely criticized. Therefore, it is 
not surprise if “the central demand of democratic reform movement in Indonesia 
includes the supremacy of democratically elected civilian authority vis-a-vis the 
security forces, and the prevention of the military involvement in domestic political 
and business affairs” (Heiduk, 2011, 256).. Placing the army under civilian control is 
absolutely necessary in order to create professional soldiers. The extraction of 
Indonesian army from politics can be seen as a major step to support the 
implementation of good governance, law enforcement and government 
accountability. Here, two preconditions consisted of “the existence of strong political 
institutions and the achievement of legitimacy” (Lee, 2000, 703) are necessary 
provisions for enhancing civilian supremacy.  Accordingly, the army has to solely 
focus on its function in the matters of defense as the idea of democratic rule 
requires. It means that the army should submit its loyalty to civilian supremacy. And 
it should not topple authority of civilian administration. But it is important to note that 
the army is a tool of the state for defending the country from external threats, not a 
tool of power used as a regime to maintain its own interest. 
The army was in weak position after the fall of the New Order. Even the army 
could not avoid public enthusiasm for democratic reform, and prevent Suharto’s 
resignation from presidential office. To certain extent, claims that the roles of the 
army in politics were in decline were reasonable because the army was under 
domestic and international pressure to reform its organization as professional 
institution in the matters of defence. The army did not have another option except 
accepting reform agendas. But it remained relatively strong as a political actor. This 
could be seen in the case of human right violation after a ballot on self-determination 
of East Timor from Indonesia’s territory. Here, “the army was against explicit wishes 
of President Habibie whereas it orchestrated the campaign of violence and 
intimidation of the East Timorese people” (Kingsbury, 2000, 304). Besides, it played 
important roles in negotiating regime change and influencing political development of 
the country. Although it rhetorically had commitment to leave political matters to 
civilian politicians, army adventurism into politics seemed difficult to be extracted. 
Without retiring from military, some army officers also occupied crucial positions in 
the cabinets. This simply indicated that political structure of the New Order was not 
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really collapse. Therefore, the army still enjoyed its privileges in the new political 
system. 
Army’s political engagement in the early phase of democratic transition was 
mainly because “intrasystemic transfer of power from Suharto to his deputy avoided 
the complete destruction of the regime and allowed many its components including 
the armed forces to make a relatively smooth transfer into new polity. The disunity 
among civilian politicians also contributed to this matter. The fragmentation of 
Indonesia’s civilian politicians caused the failure of societal and political 
organizations to form a united opposition front against the government. No credible 
figures and teams outside the government were able to replace the ruling elites. 
Accordingly, it was bureaucrats and politicians associated with the regime who took 
the main beneficiaries of the transfer of power facilitated by senior military officers” 
(Mietzner, 2006, 5-8). 
The attempt to put the army completely under civilian control is long process. 
It should be done gradually to prevent military blacklash to civilian administration. In 
the early phase of post-authoritarian regime, President B. J. Habibie leading the new 
government succesfully took important decisions to reform Indonesia’s political 
system such as introducing fresh general election inviting participation from various 
political parties, press freedom, and also expanding civil liberties. A new pattern of 
civil-military relations under democratic climate was also redefined. Main agendas of 
military reform that could be identified in the early years of Indonesia’s democratic 
transition included breaking off military roles in politics, changing organizational 
structure of Indonesian army, investigating human right abuses done by the army, 
and removing army involvement in economic and business activities to cut off its 
ability in self funding (Wulan, 2008, 9). 
The exclusion of active military personnel from government and public 
institutions became first priority of democratic regime as a way of depoliticization of 
the armed forces. Social and political role of the army was gradually decreased. But 
“this progress did not lead to a comprehensive and lasting strengthening of civilian 
control over the core political decisionmaking areas” (Croissant & Kuehn, 2009, 194). 
This was because policy of compromises between Habibie and the military 
leadership. The new government gave the army autonomy to define and implement 
their own internal reform. There was mutual dependence between the new president 
and the armed forces at that time. The former relied relied on support from the 
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armed forces to stabilize his rule, fend off societal challenges to his legitimacy, and 
prevent individual officers from undermining the reformist policies of his 
administration. On the other hand, the policies taken by the president in appointing 
senior military leaders, distributing resources and setting the political agenda would 
give advantages to the armed forces (Mietzner, 2006, 10). 
Therefore, it was not surprising if initial military reform worked in favour of the 
armed forces. The scope and the contents of depoliticization and redefinition of its 
political role was decided by the army (Croissant & Kuehn, 2009, 194). The army 
introduced a new paradigm consisted of four points underlining its roles under 
democratic regime: (1) the military does not have to take the lead of national affairs; 
(2) the military will no longer occupy political institutions; instead it will influence 
political decisions; (3) this influence will be exerted indirectly; (4) the military will work 
with other national entities in making important national decisions (Anwar, 2001, 24). 
Other significant steps to reduce army’s political adventurism has been made 
by the military. The concept of dwifungsi that gave the army legitimacy to actively 
involve in was finally abolished. The army accepted a decision reducing its political 
representatives from 75 to 38 seats in legislative councils. Representatives of the 
army in legislative was not elected in a ballot. Rather, they were appointed. Another 
initiative was the separation between the police and military. The police will be dealt 
with internal disorders while the army focuses on the issues of defence. Finaly, the 
name of the military was changed from  the Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia (ABRI/Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) to Indonesia National 
Army (TNI/Tentara National Indonesia) in April 1999 (Marijan, 2011, 252-253). And 
as manifestation of its neutrality in the next general election, the formal relations 
between the army and Golkar was also cutt off. Social and political office in the army 
was also dissolved in order to marginalize the roles of the army in political affairs. 
The progress in civil-military reform faced a setback during President 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati. In the years of his presidency, Wahid made 
radical changes in order to progressively achieve military reforms. He appointed 
reformist officers in the military to occupy important posts in Indonesian army and the 
cabinet as well. Ministry of defence was also led by a civilian. He even ousted 
Wiranto, a Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Affairs and former 
commander of Indonesian army, who was responsible for human right abuses in 
East Timor in 1999 from his cabinet. Initially, Wahid leadership was strong enough  
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to push military reform. His policies “created disunity in the ranks and weakened the 
armed forces as a single political actor” (Mietzner, 2006, 26). But it did not last for 
long period. His political behaviour in misusing power caused serious problem for his 
political standing. He lost political supports from civilian politicians who were 
previously his allies. His attempt to issue emergency rule for restoring political chaos 
was refused by the army. At the same time, the army was even collaborated with 
opposition to oust Wahid from presidential office. Finally, Wahid was impeached by 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) or People’s Consultative Assembly in 2001. 
The army was able to consolidate its power under Megawati administration. 
This situation came into existence due to domestic and international considerations. 
The outbreak of communal conflicts in several province in Indonesia proved that the 
army has been the only capable actor in dealing with internal disorders. Threats to 
territorial integrity posed by separatist movement in Aceh and Papua supported the 
army to regain its political weight in influencing government policies to cope the 
issues. The fear of national disintegrity gave chances for army adventurism in 
national politics and decision-making processes. Government efforts to negotiate 
with GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) or Aceh’s Free Movement was failed because it 
was sabotaged by the army. The army preferred military operation to solve the crisis.  
The campaign of war on terror sponsored by the United States since 2001 
also made external pressure on the Indonesian armed forces and its human right 
violation was decreased. Even the US goverment re-open cooperation with 
Indonesian army for the purpose of coping with terrorism threats. This was based on 
an assumption that “the provision of additional equipment, professional training and 
icreased defence cooperation facilitated by the US government would translate into 
an intensified campaign by Indonesia’s security forces against radical groups in the 
country”. This point of view actually did not correlate with the reality. “The domestic 
power of Indonesian army has never rested on the number of its personnel, the 
quality of its equipment,  or the education of its officers. It is based on politically 
negotiated and supported network of territorial units securing the financial 
independence of the army from civilian control mechanism” (Mietzner, 2002, 71-72). 
President Wahid actually tried to address the issue of territorial command structure 
by appointing reformist general such as Agus Wirahadikusumah as Army Strategic 
Reserve Command, but he failed and even lost his presidential position. 
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Megawati’s decision to give concession the army on military management 
was another cause for power consolidation of the army. Of course, this was done in 
order to get support from the army to her rule. The experience as vice precident in 
the Wahid’s cabinet made her aware on rules of the game among civilian politicians 
who also took their own parts in facilitating the fall of Wahid’s presidency. It would be 
risky for her rule if she put totally her trust to politicians. “The distrust between key 
civilian leaders convinced politicians to maintain good relations with the military 
particularly afer assuming executive office”. So “concessions to the military became 
an integral part of post-Suharto civilian politics” (Mietzner, 2006, 35). 
Authority of central government seemed effective under President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. The ability of Yudhoyono’s government to solve a crisis in 
Aceh peacefully was an example on exercising solid civilian control over the army. 
As a former senior officer in the army, he “knew the inner working of the army with 
an intimacy that no other post-Suharto president before him had possessed”. He 
also learned a lot from the failure of Megawati’s government in achieving peaceful 
resolution in Aceh due to disruption from top officers in the army. By eliminating 
senior general like Ryamizard Ryacudu favouring military resolution, peace 
agreement between the central government and GAM’s leaders was successfully 
secured. But “Yudhoyono has alson been responsible for some of deficiencies of the 
post-1998 civil-military relations particularly his hesitancy to push for structural 
reform that has undermined the institutionalization of civilian control mechanisms”. 
The most crucial issue that is not addressed is “Yudhoyono’s personal control has 
not been accompanied by sufficiently extensive institutional reform to make civilian 
control over the army independent from the character and the ability of the 
incumbent president” (Mietzner, 2011, 271-284). For instance, the problem of 
territorial command structure has remained untouched. The existence of army 
territorial structure has been viewed by observers as a loophole of democratic 
civilian control because it has provided opportuniy for army adventurism in politics 
from village till provincial level.  
It must be acknowledged as mentioned above that the reform of Indonesian 
army is long process. It cannot be done in a short period of time. Even the army to 
certain degree has involved in politics. Overall, the attempt to redefine civil-military 
affairs by underlining civilian supremacy over the military had made significant 
progress. Indonesia has been in middle ranking in terms of military reform compared 
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to other countries initiating reform in its military affairs as well. Official documents on 
management of military organization and military position under democratic regime 
have been published by army headquarters namely military doctrine of Tri Eka 
Darma, general policy on national defence, presidential decree on military business, 
book on military neutrality in general election, and four strategic documents from 
ministry of defence including defence white paper, defence doctrine, defence 
strategy and posture (Wulan, 2008, 78-79). The government also has formally 
passed regulations in order to strengthen institutionalization of civilian control and 
military professionalism – Law No. 2/2002 on State Defence and Law No. 34/2004 
on Indonesian National Army. Essentially, these laws ban the army involvement in 
political and economic activities (Sebastian & Gindarsah, 2013, 296). 
 
Conclsion 
Concordance theory proposed by Rebecca L. Schiff seems fit to explain a pattern of 
civil-military relations in Indonesia since its independence in 1945. By considering 
unique historical and cultural experiences of the nations, concordance theory is able 
to precisely analyze critical factors influencing army involvement in Indonesian 
politics. It will be misleading if we keep it in mind that army involvement in 
Indonesian politics was begun since the establishment of the New Order. It is true 
that the army enjoyed political privileges in this era, but the culture of political 
interventionist of the Indonesian army has already existed since the birth of 
Indonesia as a new nation. The reform of Indonesian army particulary in attemps of 
redefining civil-military relations since 1998 has made significant progress. Army’s 
direct involvement in politics was already dissolved. The concept of dwifungsi 
justifying army intervention in socio-political affairs was also abolished. Gradually, 
civilian government democratically elected by the people has performed solid control 
over the army. 
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